Cranial electrotherapy stimulation is a neuromodulation tool used for treating several clinical disorders, including insomnia, anxiety, and depression. More recently, a limited number of studies have examined CES for altering affect, physiology, and behavior in healthy, non-clinical samples. The physiological, neurochemical, and metabolic mechanisms underlying CES effects are currently unknown. Computational modeling suggests that electrical current administered with CES at the earlobes can reach cortical and subcortical regions at very low intensities associated with subthreshold neuromodulatory effects, and studies using electroencephalography (...) and functional magnetic resonance imaging show some effects on alpha band EEG activity, and modulation of the default mode network during CES administration. One theory suggests that CES modulates brain stem, limbic, and cortical regions and increases relative parasympathetic to sympathetic drive in the autonomic nervous system. There is no direct evidence supporting this theory, but one of its assumptions is that CES may induce its effects by stimulating afferent projections of the vagus nerve, which provides parasympathetic signals to the cardiorespiratory and digestive systems. In our critical review of studies using CES in clinical and non-clinical populations, we found severe methodological concerns, including potential conflicts of interest, risk of methodological and analytic biases, issues with sham credibility, lack of blinding, and a severe heterogeneity of CES parameters selected and employed across scientists, laboratories, institutions, and studies. These limitations make it difficult to derive consistent or compelling insights from the extant literature, tempering enthusiasm for CES and its potential to alter nervous system activity or behavior in meaningful or reliable ways. The lack of compelling evidence also motivates well-designed and relatively high-powered experiments to assess how CES might modulate the physiological, affective, and cognitive responses to stress. Establishing reliable empirical links between CES administration and human performance is critical for supporting its prospective use during occupational training, operations, or recovery, ensuring reliability and robustness of effects, characterizing if, when, and in whom such effects might arise, and ensuring that any benefits of CES outweigh the risks of adverse events. (shrink)

Superior motor task success has been correlated with participants’ self-reports of a larger-than-actual size of a sport-related target. In the present study, we examined whether a putting practice condition with greater success would differentially impact participants’ self-reported perceptions of the size of the putting hole during acquisition and retention. We randomly assigned participants to one of three different practice conditions and had them self-report their perceived size of the putting hole upon completion of each required putting distance. Although there were (...) no statistically significant differences between motor task success in the acquisition or retention period for the practice conditions, self-reported perceptions of target size were impacted by practice condition. During the acquisition period, participants in the self-controlled success and success-late conditions self-reported that the putting hole was larger than did participants in the success-early condition. In the retention period, participants in the self-controlled success condition perceived the target as larger than those in the success-early condition. These findings are the first to show that practice condition, independent of task success, differentially impacted self-reported perception of a target size. (shrink)

This paper explores how undergraduate students understood the social relevance of their engineering course content knowledge and drew broader social and ethical implications from that knowledge. Based on a three-year qualitative study in a junior-level engineering class, we found that students had difficulty in acknowledging the social and ethical aspects of engineering as relevant topics in their coursework. Many students considered the immediate technical usability or improved efficiency of technical innovations as the noteworthy social and ethical implications of engineering. Findings (...) suggest that highly-structured engineering programs leave little room for undergraduate students to explore the ethical dimension of engineering content knowledge and interact with other students/programs on campus to expand their “technically-minded” perspective. We discussed the issues of the “culture of disengagement” :42–72, 2014) fueled by disciplinary elitism, spatial distance, and insulated curriculum prevalent in the current structure of engineering programs. We called for more conscious effort by engineering educators to offer meaningful interdisciplinary engagement opportunities and in-class conversations on ethics that support engineering students' holistic intellectual growth and well-rounded professional ethics. (shrink)

Formalised knowledge systems, including universities and research institutes, are important for contemporary societies. They are, however, also arguably failing humanity when their impact is measured against the level of progress being made in stimulating the societal changes needed to address challenges like climate change. In this research we used a novel futures-oriented and participatory approach that asked what future envisioned knowledge systems might need to look like and how we might get there. Findings suggest that envisioned future systems will need (...) to be much more collaborative, open, diverse, egalitarian, and able to work with values and systemic issues. They will also need to go beyond producing knowledge about our world to generating wisdom about how to act within it. To get to envisioned systems we will need to rapidly scale methodological innovations, connect innovators, and creatively accelerate learning about working with intractable challenges. We will also need to create new funding schemes, a global knowledge commons, and challenge deeply held assumptions. To genuinely be a creative force in supporting longevity of human and non-human life on our planet, the shift in knowledge systems will probably need to be at the scale of the enlightenment and speed of the scientific and technological revolution accompanying the second World War. This will require bold and strategic action from governments, scientists, civic society and sustained transformational intent. (shrink)

Partly due to the influence of Tarski's work, it is commonly assumed that any good theory of truth implies biconditionals of the sort mentioned in Convention T: instances of the T-Schema "s is true in L if and only if p" where the sentence substituted for "p" is equivalent in meaning to s. I argue that we must take care to distinguish the claim that implying such instances is sufficient for adequacy in an account of truth from the claim that (...) doing so is necessary. The claim that doing so is sufficient is a common component of deflationary theories of truth, while the claim that it is necessary, though often assumed, must be denied by proponents of rival inflationary theories of truth. I discuss the clarification of the debate between these views of truth that results from distinguishing the necessity and the sufficiency claims, and examine the prospects for its resolution. (shrink)

Tarski’s Convention T is often taken to claim that it is both sufficient and necessary for adequacy in a definition of truth that it imply instances of the T-schema where the embedded sentence translates the mentioned sentence. However, arguments against the necessity claim have recently appeared, and, furthermore, the necessity claim is actually not required for the indefinability results for which Tarski is justly famous; indeed, Tarski’s own presentation of the results in the later Undecidable Theories makes no mention of (...) an assumption to the effect that the definition of truth implies the biconditionals. This raises a question: was Tarski in fact committed to the necessity claim in the important papers of the 1930s and 40s? I argue that he was not. The discussion of this apparently esoteric interpretive issue in fact gets to the heart of many important questions about truth, and in the final sections of the paper I discuss the importance of the T-biconditionals in the theory of meaning and the relation of deflationary and inflationary theories of truth to the semantic paradoxes. (shrink)

Toward the end of Ender's Game, after the manipulations of the Battle School officials stand exposed, Ender Wiggin must face the terrible consequences of what has really been going on during the last simulation. In the spirit of diplomacy, political leaders decide that Ender will not return home, since his presence on Earth could spark a war. Instead, he will be part of the pioneering groups launched out into space to explore and to establish settlements on the “bugger worlds.” We (...) gradually realize that Ender has another destiny‐revealed through the significant philotic connection that the Formic hive‐queen has made with him‐the new role of Speaker for the Dead. The special nature of his connection with the buggers is the real reason Ender cannot go home. In searching for a way to bring back the Formics, Ender has to establish a new community. (shrink)

It is often thought that instances of the T-schema such as snow is white is true if and only if snow is white state correspondences between sentences andthe world, and that therefore such sentences play a crucial role in correspondence theories oftruth. I argue that this assumption trivializes the correspondence theory: even a disquotationaltheory of truth would be a correspondence theory on this conception. This discussionallows one to get clearer about what a correspondence theory does claim, and toward the end (...) of thepaper I discuss what a true correspondence theory of truth would involve. (shrink)

This study assessed the demographic characteristics of Koreans engaged in leisure sports activities during the COVID-19 pandemic and the differences in their preventive health behaviors and constraints on leisure activities. For this study, the demographic characteristics of 544 leisure sport participants, who were recruited on a nationwide basis, were examined through an online survey. Then, comparisons between groups were performed using independent t-tests, one-way analysis of variance, and multivariate analysis of variance. Women who participated in both indoor and outdoor leisure (...) sports showed higher adoption of health prevention behaviors than their male counterparts, and married individuals who participated in indoor leisure sports showed higher adoption of health prevention behaviors than unmarried participants. Moreover, individuals who participated in both indoor and outdoor leisure sports by themselves had many interpersonal constraints overall, and the group of married individuals who participated in indoor leisure sports showed structural constraints. In conclusion, leisure sports participants have adopted many health prevention behaviors during the COVID-19 pandemic, but this had led to some interpersonal constraints. These results indicate that, in the case of future pandemics, personal and institutional efforts will need to be made to promote participation in leisure sports and prevent excessive social isolation. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: References.

Our society’s professions, including the health professions, have long overlooked the possibility that one might learn something valuable about one’s own profession’s ethics by studying the ethics of other professions. Reflecting on the preceding article by Ritwik, Patterson, and Alfonzo-Echeverri, one can identify important similarities between dentistry’s professional ethics and the ethics of the other health professions. But there are also important differences between these professions’ ethics that should prompt reflection on the reasons for these differences, perhaps challenge something (...) that has been taken for granted in one’s own profession, and in any case facilitate better mutual understanding and more effective inter-professional collaboration. (shrink)

S. Adams, W. Ambrose, A. Andretta, H. Becker, R. Camerlo, C. Champetier, J.P.R. Christensen, D.E. Cohen, A. Connes. C. Dellacherie, R. Dougherty, R.H. Farrell, F. Feldman, A. Furman, D. Gaboriau, S. Gao, V. Ya. Golodets, P. Hahn, P. de la Harpe, G. Hjorth, S. Jackson, S. Kahane, A.S. Kechris, A. Louveau,, R. Lyons, P.-A. Meyer, C.C. Moore, M.G. Nadkarni, C. Nebbia, A.L.T. Patterson, U. Krengel, A.J. Kuntz, J.-P. Serre, S.D. Sinel'shchikov, T. Slaman, Solecki, R. Spatzier, J. Steel, D. Sullivan, (...) S. Thomas, A. Valette, V.S. Varadarajan, B. Velickovic, B. Weiss, J.D.M. Wright, R.J. Zimmer. (shrink)

Calls for the expansion of ethics education in the business and accounting curricula have resulted in a variety of interventions including additional material on ethical cases, the code of conduct, and the development of new courses devoted to ethical development [Lampe, J.: 1996]. The issue of whether ethics should be taught has been addressed by many authors [see for example: Hanson, K. O.: 1987; Huss, H. F. and D. M. Patterson: 1993; Jones, T. M.: 1988–1989; Kerr, D. S. and (...) L. M. Smith : 1995; Loeb, S. E.: 1988; McDonald, G. M. and G. D. Donleavy: 1995]. The question addressed in this paper is not whether ethics should be taught but whether accounting students can reason more ethically after an intervention based on a discrete and dedicated course on accounting ethics. The findings in this paper indicate that a discrete intervention emphasising dilemma discussion has a positive and significant effect on students’ moral reasoning and development. The data collected from interviews suggest that the salient influences on moral judgement development include: learning theories of ethics particularly Kohlberg’s theory of cognitive moral reasoning and development; peer learning; and moral discourse. The implications from the findings in this study suggest that moral reasoning is responsive to particular types of ethics intervention and educators should carefully plan their attempts to foster moral judgement development. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:366 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY In harmony with Glaucon or Kant, but unlike Thrasymachus, Ballard is unconvinced by Socrates' virtual identification of virtue with art (T~xpv)or expert knowledge (cf. 24f., 50-79). For the "tragic" intellectualism embraced by both Socrates and Thrasymachus precludes the "existential loyalty" prized by Ballard's Plato and Plato's Glaucon. Against "existential loyalty," Socrates' philosopher-kings, if left to themselves, would commit crimes of omission perhaps more heinous than (...) the crimes of commission perpetrated by Thrasymachus' paragon of wisdom, the perfect tyrant. Although aware that only their leadership can prevent the greatest evils in states, philosophers nevertheless refuse to rule, even in the ideal state, unless compelled (cf. Republic, 519B7-520A4). Thus neither Thrasymachus' tyrant nor Socrates' philosopher would willingly sacrifice their own pleasure and happiness for the common good. Their "epicurean" taste contrasts sharply with Ballard's more Kantian or Biblical call for "existential loyalty." No compulsion would be necessary to obtain the return of Ballard's philosophers to the political responsibilities of the "cave." For his subordination of reason to myth precludes escape from the "cave" either in the satanic direction of Thrasymachus or the divine direction of Socrates (cf. 120). However one may evaluate Ballard's solution to the central problem of Platonism, his book surely encourages the dialectic which, in spite of his intentions, may lead to the knowledge cherished by the Republic's Thrasymachus and Socrates. Against their "tragic" intellectualism, neither Ballard nor anyone else can prove more than what the Republic's Socrates admitted: The fact of infallible knowledge is incontestable only for those experiencing it within themselves, while the claim to possess it necessarily seems mere pretense or, at worst, tragic hubris to men whose introspection reveals no rational instrument (~p~,~ov) capable of apprehending the absolute good (Republic, 527D5--528A1; cf. Protagoras, 352A8-353B3; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, l177B27-11791A3; Metaphysics, 982B28-98385). The following minor errors were noted: Page 6, note 1: read "Bury" for "Bary"; page 24 (line 7 from bottom): read "Prot. 358C for "Prot. 385C" ; page 28, line 4: read "Nicias" for "Nisias" ; page 66 (line 8 from bottom): read "Republic IX" for "Republic IV." HARRY NEUMANN Scripps College Plato on Immortality. By Robert Leet Patterson. (University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965. Pp. 141. $5.00.) In this sympathetic account of Plato's arguments for the immortality of the soul (as presented in the Phaedo and the Phaedrus) Professor Patterson has attempted to argue that Plato believed that his arguments were complete 'demonstrations' of the immortality of the soul. The author is concerned to indicate the intention, the background, and the structure of the various arguments which Socrates presents in defense of the view that the soul is immortal. In the course of his discussions Patterson seems to involve himself in a number of large issues (e.g, the problem of psycho-physical dualism, the concept of substance, the critique of materialism and epiphenomenalism, and the meaning of Plato's doctrine of Forms) which are not dealt with comprehensively and which transcend the primary concern of his book. The digressions which lead Patterson into exceedingly difficult philosophical problems and, in some cases, into the realm of exotic analogies (e.g., he at one point compares Plato's dualism to the views of Jainism, Hinayana, Samkhya, Nyaya-Vaiseshik, and Mimamsa metaphysics I) detract from the value of the book and tend to divert him from his basic intention. His defences of Plato's arguments are, on the other hand, interesting, if debatable. The basic teaching of the Phaedo is, it is said, that the soul in essence does not belong to the realm of becoming, but is a sempiternal entity. The first argument which Socrates prepublic : Utopia or Dystopia? " (The Modern Schoolman, May, 1967). On the relation of sophistry to the problem of the xwp~qp~,see Diotim~ts Concept of Love," American Journal of Philology, 86 (1965), 47-50. BOOK REVIEWS 367 sents is said to have a "Heraclitean" structure (p. 22) presumably because it appeals to a conception of "opposites." On this basis, the argument could just as well be described as Pythagorean. At any rate, the argument assumes... (shrink)

We (Patterson & Plaut, 2009) argued that cognitive neuropsychology has had a limited impact on cognitive science due to a nearly exclusive reliance on (a) single‐case studies, (b) dissociations in cognitive performance, and (c) shallow, box‐and‐arrow theorizing, and we advocated adopting a case‐series methodology, considering associations as well as dissociations, and employing explicit computational modeling in studying “how the brain does its cognitive business.” In reply, Coltheart (2010) claims that our concern is misplaced because cognitive neuropsychology is concerned only (...) with studying the mind, in terms of its “functional architecture,” without regard to how this is implemented in the brain. In this response, we do not dispute his characterization of cognitive neuropsychology as it has typically been practiced over the last 40 years, but we suggest that our understanding of brain structure and function has advanced to the point where studying the mind without regard to the brain is unwise and perpetuates the field’s isolation. (shrink)

Horst Dietrich Preuss, Old Testament TheologyRolf P. Knierim, The Task of Old Testament Theology: Essays, Substance, Method and CasesDaniel Patte, Ethics of Biblical Interpretation: A Re‐evaluationBrian D. Ingraffia, Postmodern Theory and Biblical Theology: Vanquishing God's ShadowJohn Barclay and John Sweet, Early Christian Thought in its Jewish ContextStephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall and Gerald O'Collins, The Resurrection: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Resurrection of JesusMaureen A. Tilley, Donatist Martyr Stories: The Church in Conflict in Roman North AfricaMaureen A. Tilley, The Bible (...) in Christian North Africa: The Donatist WorldL. G. Patterson, Methodius of Olympus: Divine Sovereignty, Human Freedom and Life in ChristJ. H. D. Scourfield, Consoling Heliodorus: A Commentary on Jerome, Letter 60C. Moreschini and D. A. Sykes, St Gregory of Nazianzus: Poemata ArcanaPeter O'Dwyer, Towards a History of Irish SpiritualityUinseann Ó Maid'n, The Celtic Monk: Rules and Writings of Early Irish MonksDáibhíÓ Cróinín, Early Medieval Ireland 400–1200Gerhard Ladner, God, Cosmos, Humankind: The World of Early Christian SymbolismKevin Trainor, Relics, Ritual and Representation in Buddhism: Rematerializing the Sri Lankan Theravãda TraditionSteven F. Ostrow, Art and Spirituality in Counter‐Reformation Rome: The Sistine and Pauline Chapels in S. Maria MaggioreDavid Morgan, Visual Piety: A History and Theory of Popular Religious ImagesColleen McDannell, Material Christianity: Religion and Popular Culture in AmericaSarah Coakley, Religion and the BodyPaul F. Bradshaw and Lawrence A. Hoffman, Life Cycles in Jewish and Christian WorshipGordon P. Jeanes, The Day Has Come! Easter and Baptism in Zeno of VeronaJohn Macquarrie, A Guide to the SacramentsMegan McKenna, Rites of Justice: The Sacraments and Liturgy as Ethical ImperativesDouglas J. Davies, Death, Ritual and Belief. (shrink)

This essay is a response to the important central theme of Michael Green's recent article, Dworkin's Fallacy, or What the Philosophy of Language Can't Teach Us about the Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1897 (2003), which considers the relationship between the philosophy of language and the philosophy of law. Green argues forcefully that a number of theorists with quite different viewpoints commonly maintain a connection between the two which turns out to be unfounded. It is accepted that it is wrong (...) to assume such a connection, but it is suggested that Green has failed to recognise the connection that can be established between the two disciplines due to the particular way in which law as a practice uses words. The reasons given by Green for seeking to maintain a distinction between ordinary language practice and the language practice of the law are considered and rejected in part I of the essay. The general conclusion is reached that, irrespective of which position is adopted in the philosophy of law, at the point of judgment the philosophy of law and the philosophy of language are inextricably linked in being concerned to account for the same practice. Part II of the essay considers the basic issues for the philosophy of language addressed in Green's article, which are concerned with the search for the mechanism which links a particular meaning to a word. One reading of Wittgenstein's rule skepticism, supported by Dennis Patterson, is to reject the existence of any mechanism interrupting the direct connection between the capacity we possess in our language practice and the capacity we possess in the practice to which our language refers. Patterson provides another target for Green's allegation that theorists who take a position in the philosophy of law from their position in the philosophy of language are committing a fallacy. However, it is pointed out that within the Patterson-Wittgenstein position, there is no possibility of moving from one position to the other since both positions are already necessarily connected. The remaining discussion in Part II then explores the apparently common connection between law and language established within the practice of judgment and within the general view of the nature of language favoured in Patterson's reading of Wittgenstein. It is argued that Wittgenstein's philosophical method may maintain a connection between law and language, and the positions adopted within their respective philosophies, but is incapable of resolving the controversy between competing views of how law/"law" should be understood. By contrast, the practice of judgment is used precisely to resolve controversy. Although this judgment is concerned primarily with a specific part of the law, its significance extends to how we regard the philosophical endeavours that need to provide an account of it. This provides lessons for both the philosophy of language and the philosophy of law. (shrink)

La filosofía desde la teoría general del derecho, por H. Cairns.--Teoría jurídica integralista, por J. Hall.--Más allá del pragmatismo jurídico, por T.A. Cowan.--La tecla para una ciencia jurídica estimativa, por A.H. Pekelis.--Palabras y música, por J. Frank.--Teoría de los intereses sociales de Pound, por E.W. Patterson.--La metamorfosis de la idea de justicia, por H. Kelsen.--Sobre la naturaleza del derecho natural, por A.-H. Chroust.

Personalist thought offers fundamental perspectives which are able to shape the broader fields of philosophy, theology, and related areas of study. Familiarity with the scope of its recent developments is valuable not only for personalist scholars but also for those interested in non-materialist thought and especially the problems and questions of the person in various aspects. This work, bringing together papers from a 2019 conference, aims to serve these readerships. It will also provide an archival record of the state of (...) the field at this point in Western intellectual history. In terms of content, the work addresses four general themes: personalist thought as it is encountered in the writings of particular scholars; the place of personalism within broader philosophical thought; personalist engagement with major religious traditions; and the application of personalist modes of thinking to a range of real-world questions. The book is unique in that it brings together multiple strands of personalist thought, demonstrating its breadth and depth and its ability to engage in wider contemporary philosophical and cultural debates. (shrink)